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* Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by
Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (hereinafter “Affordable Care Act”
or “Act”).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
This case challenges Congress’s authority to
require private citizens to purchase and maintain
“minimum essential” healthcare insurance coverage
under penalty of federal law (hereinafter “individual
mandate”) pursuant to the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act.*  Petitioners, who are subject to
the individual mandate, seek review of the divided
opinion of the Sixth Circuit, which upheld the
constitutionality of the mandate as a proper exercise
of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
1. Does Congress have authority under the Commerce
Clause to require private citizens to purchase and
maintain “minimum essential” healthcare insurance
coverage under penalty of federal law?
2. Is the individual mandate provision of the Act
unconstitutional as applied to Petitioners who are
without healthcare insurance? 
 ii 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The Petitioners are Thomas More Law Center,
Jann DeMars, John Ceci, Steven Hyder, and Salina
Hyder (collectively referred to as “Petitioners”).
The Respondents are President Barack Hussein
Obama, in his official capacity as President of the
United States; Kathleen Sebelius, in her official
capacity as Secretary, United States Department of
Health and Human Services; Eric H. Holder, Jr., in his
official capacity as Attorney General of the United
States; and Timothy F. Geithner, in his official
capacity as Secretary, United States Department of
Treasury (collectively referred to as “Respondents”).
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals, App. 1a,
appears at 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265 (6th Cir. June
29, 2011).  The opinion of the district court, App. 97a,
is reported at 720 F. Supp. 2d 882.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on June 29, 2011.  App. 90a-91a.  The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Relevant statutory provisions are reprinted in the
appendix to this petition.  App. 121a-146a.
STATEMENT
This case challenges the constitutionality of the
individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care
Act, which requires private citizens, including
Petitioners, to purchase and maintain “minimum
essential” healthcare insurance coverage under
21 See Affordable Care Act at § 1501 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A(a)).  App. 121a-132a.  Individuals who fail to satisfy the
“individual responsibility requirement” must pay a monetary
penalty.  See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1); App. 121a; see also 42
U.S.C. § 18091(1) (referring to the “individual responsibility
requirement”); App. 143a.
2 The Sixth Circuit held that the Act was not an exercise of
Congress’s taxing power and thus could not be upheld on that
basis.  App. 39a-47a, 74a.
3 A ruling that the individual mandate is unconstitutional does
not mean that Congress is without power to “fix” the national
healthcare system.  Such a ruling would simply reaffirm the
fundamental notion that when the government acts, it must do so
consistent with the Constitution. See Bond v. United States, No.
09-1227, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4558, at *17-*19 (June 16, 2011).
4 As Senior District Judge Graham, sitting by designation,
observed in his dissenting opinion below, 
To the fatalistic view that Congress will always prevail
and courts should step back and let the people, if offended,
speak through their political representatives, I say that
“courts were designed to be an intermediate body between
the people and the legislature, in order, among other
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to
their authority.”  The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton).  In
penalty of federal law.1  Petitioners contend that
Congress exceeded its authority under the
Constitution by enacting this mandate.2
The ultimate question for this Court is a legal one.
At its core, this case is about the constitutional limits
of the federal government.3  When Congress acts
beyond those limits, as here, the judicial branch should
exercise its authority as the guardian of our
Constitution and enjoin the ultra vires acts.4  
3this arena, the “public force” is entrusted to the courts.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L.
Rev. 457, 457 (1897).  “[W]here the will of the legislature,
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the
people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to
be governed by the latter rather than the former.”  The
Federalist No. 78.
App. 87a (dissenting).
5 The individual mandate provision requires each “applicable
individual” to purchase health insurance or be subject to what the
Act calls appropriately a “penalty,” and at times euphemistically
a “Shared Responsibility Payment.”  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b).  The
definition of an “applicable individual,” which triggers this
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, is mere existence
because the definition begins with any “individual” and then
provides three exclusions: (1) religious objectors who oppose
health insurance in principle; (2) non-residents or illegal
residents; and (3) incarcerated individuals.  26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A(d)(2), (3), & (4); App. 125a-126a.  
Petitioners request that the Court grant review of
this case and strike down the individual mandate to
“prove” that “a meaningful limit on Congress’s
commerce powers exists.”  See infra text at 6-7; App.
50a.
1. President Obama signed the Affordable Care
Act into law on March 23, 2010.  An essential provision
of the Act requires private citizens, including
Petitioners, to purchase and maintain “minimum
essential” healthcare coverage under penalty of federal
law.5  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a); App. 5a-7a, 121a.  What is
considered an acceptable or “minimum essential” level
of healthcare coverage is determined by the federal
46 Simply having insurance is not enough.  To avoid a penalty, the
health insurance plan must include, at a minimum, ambulatory
patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity
and newborn care, mental health and substance abuse treatment,
prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and
devices, laboratory services, preventative services, wellness
services, chronic disease management, pediatric services, and
dental and vision care for children.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1);
App. 6a, 133a-134a.
government.6  See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1); App. 6a,
133a-134a.  If a private citizen does not purchase and
maintain an acceptable level of healthcare coverage,
the Act imposes monetary penalties.  26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A(b)(1); App. 6a-7a, 121a.
2. Petitioner Thomas More Law Center (“TMLC”)
is a national public interest law firm based in Ann
Arbor, Michigan.  TMLC’s employees receive
healthcare insurance through an employer healthcare
plan sponsored and contributed to by TMLC.  TMLC’s
healthcare plan is subject to the provisions and
regulations of the Act.  TMLC objects, through its
members, which include Petitioners DeMars and
Steven Hyder, to being forced to purchase healthcare
insurance coverage under penalty of federal law.  App.
4a.
Petitioners DeMars, Ceci, Steven Hyder, and Salina
Hyder are United States citizens, Michigan residents,
and federal taxpayers.  Petitioners Ceci, Steven Hyder,
and Salina Hyder do not have private healthcare
insurance, and they object to being compelled by the
federal government to purchase healthcare coverage
pursuant to the Act.  Petitioner DeMars obtained
5private healthcare insurance during the pendency of
this appeal.  App. 8a-10a.
Petitioners have arranged their personal affairs
such that it will be a hardship for them to have to
either pay for health insurance that is not necessary or
desirable or face penalties under the Act.  App. 9a.
3. Similar to the district court, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that all Petitioners have standing to
advance this constitutional challenge and that their
claims are ripe for review.  App. 8a-15a.  Moreover, the
court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act does not
bar this action.  App. 15a-19a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
1. Review is necessary to establish a meaningful
limitation on congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.  As this Court’s own rules provide,
certiorari is appropriate when “a United States court
of appeals has decided an important question of
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court.”  Sup. Ct. R. 10(c).  
As noted by the Congressional Budget Office in
August 1994:
A mandate requiring all individuals to purchase
health insurance would be an unprecedented
form of federal action.  The government has
never required people to buy any good or service
as a condition of lawful residence in the United
States.  
See App. 57a.  
6In its order upholding the constitutionality of the
individual mandate, the district court acknowledged
this historical reality, stating, “The Court has never
needed to address the activity/inactivity distinction
advanced by plaintiffs because in every Commerce
Clause case presented thus far, there has been some
sort of activity.  In this regard, the [Affordable Care]
Act arguably presents an issue of first impression.”
App. 114a.
Circuit Judge Sutton and Senior District Judge
Graham, sitting by designation, both noted in their
respective opinions the need for this Court to address
the limits of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority in
the context of this case, which has national
importance.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Sutton made the
following relevant observation:
At one level, past is precedent, and one tilts at
hopeless causes in proposing new categorical
limits on the commerce power.  But there is
another way to look at these precedents—that
the Court either should stop saying that a
meaningful limit on Congress’s commerce
powers exists or prove that it is so.  The stakes
of identifying such a limit are high because the
congressional power to regulate is the power to
preempt, a power not just to regulate a subject
co-extensively with the States but also to wipe
out any contrary state laws on the subject.  U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  The [Petitioners] present a
plausible limiting principle, claiming that a
mandate to buy medical insurance crosses a line
between regulating action and inaction,
77 In his opinion, Circuit Judge Martin stated that “the
Constitution imposes no categorical bar on regulating inactivity.”
App. 36a. 
between regulating those who have entered a
market and those who have not, one that the
Court and Congress have never crossed before.7
App. 50a.  Judge Sutton further stated “that we at the
court of appeals are not just fallible but utterly non-
final in this case. . . .”  App. 50a.  He echoed this
sentiment throughout his opinion, describing himself
on one occasion as a “middle-management judge.”
App. 45a.  Judge Sutton further observed that
Petitioners presented “a theory of constitutional
invalidity that the Court has never considered before,”
thus concluding that this “proves only that the
Supreme Court has considerable discretion in
resolving this dispute.”  See App. 59a.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Graham stated,
Notwithstanding Raich, I believe the Court
remains committed to the path laid down by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas to establish a
framework of meaningful limitations on
congressional power under the Commerce
Clause.  The current case is an opportunity to
prove it so.  
App. 88a.  
8Judge Graham concluded his dissenting opinion
with a cogent explanation for why the Court should
grant this petition:
If the exercise of power is allowed and the
mandate upheld, it is difficult to see what the
limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority would be.  What aspect of human
activity would escape federal power?  The
ultimate issue in this case is this: Does the
notion of federalism still have vitality?  To
approve the exercise of power would arm
Congress with the authority to force individuals
to do whatever it sees fit (within boundaries like
the First Amendment and Due Process Clause),
as long as the regulation concerns an activity or
decision that, when aggregated, can be said to
have some loose, but-for-type of economic
connection, which nearly all human activity
does. . . .  Such a power feels very much like the
general police power that the Tenth
Amendment reserves to the States and the
people.  A structural shift of that magnitude can
be accomplished legitimately only through
constitutional amendment.
App. 88a-89a (dissenting).
2. a. The Court has referred to the principles that
establish the fundamental structure of our government
embodied in the Constitution, which limits the powers
of the federal government to those expressly
enumerated, as “first principles”:
We start with first principles.  The Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated
9powers.  As James Madison wrote, “The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined.  Those
which are to remain in the State governments
are numerous and indefinite.”  This
constitutionally mandated division of authority
was “adopted by the Framers to ensure
protection of our fundamental liberties.”  Just
as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government
serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive
power in any one branch, a healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
The first of the discreet enumerated powers of the
federal government are set out in Article I, section 8 of
the Constitution.  The third of this first grouping of
powers is the Commerce Clause, which grants
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
b. From the early days of our Republic until the
present, the Court has confronted and grappled with
the meaning and scope of the phrase “Commerce . . .
among the several States.”  In the first of these cases,
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), the Court held
that “commerce” included more than just the “traffic”
of goods from one state to another; it also included the
regulation of commercial “intercourse,” such as
navigation on the country’s waterways.  Id. at 189-90.
10
8 See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981).
Over the course of the Commerce Clause’s long and
storied jurisprudence, the Court has mapped out a
three-prong analysis to determine if a federal law (or
a regulatory regime promulgated pursuant to it)
properly falls within this enumerated grant of
authority.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-57, 568-74, 583
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 593-99 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (reviewing the history of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
Beginning with Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971), every important Commerce Clause opinion has
expressly adopted a three-prong analysis to test
whether legislation falls within the bounds of
permissibly regulated activities.8  Id. at 150.  This
inquiry presumes that Congress may regulate: (1) “the
use of the channels of interstate commerce,” such as
regulations covering the interstate shipment of stolen
goods; (2) to protect “the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce,” such as legislation criminalizing the
destruction of aircraft and theft from interstate
commerce; and (3) “those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.”  Lopez, 514 at 558-59; see
also Perez, 402 U.S. at 150.
While the first two categories are rather
straightforward because they touch upon interstate
commerce directly, it is the last category that has so
vexed the Court.  Notwithstanding the vexation
11
9 Similarly, the plaintiffs in Heart of Atlanta Motel and
Katzenbach, unlike Petitioners here, could opt out of the motel
and restaurant markets and thus place themselves beyond the
reach of Congress.  
quotient of this prong, its rationale is manifestly
plausible.  That is, while there are some local
commercial activities that in themselves do not
participate whatsoever in interstate commerce, they
are nonetheless quite obviously commercial activities
that “substantially affect” interstate commerce.
Two civil rights era cases of this sort are Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964), and its companion case, Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).  These cases involved a
challenge to the then-recently enacted civil rights
legislation, which prevented motel-hotel owners and
restaurateurs, respectively, from discriminating
against their minority consumers.  The Court in those
cases made clear that a purely local activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce, such as
providing lodging accommodations or food to customers
traveling interstate and dealing in and consuming
goods that were very much a part of interstate
commerce, is properly within the reach of the
Commerce Clause because the local activity
substantially and directly affects interstate commerce.
Thus, in both cases, the plaintiffs had made an
affirmative choice to engage in commercial
activity—activity that Congress could regulate.9
This third prong begins to vex, however, when the
Court expands its reach to include a purely local, non-
commercial activity, which may or may not ever affect
12
interstate commerce, simply because it is an integral
part of a broader statutory scheme that permissibly
regulates interstate commerce.  The two model cases
of this sort—bookends separated by more than 60
years—are Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942),
and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  
In Wickard, the Court held that a regulatory
scheme permissibly regulating commercial, interstate
agricultural activity could properly capture the non-
commercial, economic activity of individual wheat
farmers growing wheat for their own personal
consumption precisely because this activity could have
an adverse affect on the regulatory scheme’s price
control mechanisms.  Similarly, in Raich, the Court
concluded, relying in large part on Wickard, that non-
commercial, home-grown, medicinal marijuana was
permissibly captured by the legislative regulatory
scheme because Congress could rationally conclude
that some of this marijuana would leak into the illegal
interstate commercial market, which was the central
target of the statutory scheme.
Vexation is inescapable, however, because nestled
in between Wickard and Raich are two modern cases
which are widely understood to cabin the Commerce
Clause’s reach by prohibiting the federal regulation of
purely local, non-commercial activity.  Both United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), invalidated federal
statutes which sought impermissibly to regulate
purely local, non-commercial activity—activity
Congress had concluded quite rationally could affect
interstate commerce.  Specifically, in Lopez, the Court
confronted the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,
which criminalized possession of a gun within a
13
statutorily defined school zone.  It is worth a moment’s
pause here to follow the Court’s reasoning in rejecting
the Commerce Clause’s reach into this domain of non-
commercial activity:
The Government’s essential contention, in fine,
is that we may determine here that § 922(q) is
valid because possession of a firearm in a local
school zone does indeed substantially affect
interstate commerce.  The Government argues
that possession of a firearm in a school zone
may result in violent crime and that violent
crime can be expected to affect the functioning
of the national economy in two ways.  First, the
costs of violent crime are substantial, and,
through the mechanism of insurance, those costs
are spread throughout the population.  [United
States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.
1991)].  Second, violent crime reduces the
willingness of individuals to travel to areas
within the country that are perceived to be
unsafe.  [Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379
U.S. at 253].  The Government also argues that
the presence of guns in schools poses a
substantial threat to the educational process by
threatening the learning environment.  A
handicapped educational process, in turn, will
result in a less productive citizenry.  That, in
turn, would have an adverse effect on the
Nation’s economic well-being.  As a result, the
Government argues that Congress could
rationally have concluded that § 922(q)
substantially affects interstate commerce.
We pause to consider the implications of the
Government’s arguments.  The Government
14
admits, under its “costs of crime” reasoning,
that Congress could regulate not only all violent
crime, but all activities that might lead to
violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they
relate to interstate commerce.  Similarly, under
the Government’s “national productivity”
reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity
that it found was related to the economic
productivity of individual citizens: family law
(including marriage, divorce, and child custody),
for example.  Under the theories that the
Government presents in support of § 922(q), it
is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States
historically have been sovereign.  Thus, if we
were to accept the Government’s arguments, we
are hard pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to
regulate.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64 (1995) (internal citations
and references omitted) (emphasis added).  
What is striking about Lopez is that it can hardly
be argued that it was irrational for Congress to have
concluded that possessing guns near schools would
affect interstate commerce.  It is no less of an “effect”
than the possible leakage of private, homegrown,
medicinal marijuana fully regulated by California.
But what is apparent from the lengthy quote above is
that the Lopez Court understood that if the multi-
tiered inference required to move from gun possession
to an “effect” on interstate commerce was an
appropriate nexus for upholding the constitutionality
15
of a regulation, that inference would obliterate the
Constitution’s enumeration of powers.
Morrison’s result was similar and no less vexatious
for the older Wickard and the yet to be rendered Raich.
This is especially true because in Morrison, unlike in
Lopez, Congress had made a host of explicit findings
supporting its legislation allowing a federal private
right of action for a woman violently assaulted in a
“gender-based” crime.  There the Court held:
In contrast with the lack of congressional
findings that we faced in Lopez, § 13981 is
supported by numerous findings regarding the
serious impact that gender-motivated violence
has on victims and their families.  But the
existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the
constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation.  As we stated in Lopez, “Simply
because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily make
it so.”  Rather, “whether particular operations
affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come
under the constitutional power of Congress to
regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather
than a legislative question, and can be settled
finally only by this Court.”
In these cases, Congress’s findings are
substantially weakened by the fact that they
rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we
have already rejected as unworkable if we are to
maintain the Constitution’s enumeration of
powers.  Congress found that gender-motivated
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violence affects interstate commerce “by
deterring potential victims from traveling
interstate, from engaging in employment in
interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved in interstate
commerce; . . . by diminishing national
productivity, increasing medical and other costs,
and decreasing the supply of and the demand
for interstate products.”  Given these findings
and petitioners’ arguments, the concern that we
expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the
Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the
Constitution’s distinction between national and
local authority seems well founded.  The
reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to
follow the but-for causal chain from the initial
occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of
which has always been the prime object of the
States’ police power) to every attenuated effect
upon interstate commerce.  If accepted,
petitioners’ reasoning would allow Congress to
regulate any crime as long as the nationwide,
aggregated impact of that crime has substantial
effects on employment, production, transit, or
consumption.  Indeed, if Congress may regulate
gender-motivated violence, it would be able to
regulate murder or any other type of violence
since gender-motivated violence, as a subset of
all violent crime, is certain to have lesser
economic impacts than the larger class of which
it is a part.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
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Ultimately, the majority opinion in Raich struggled
mightily with the third prong of the Commerce Clause.
This struggle was necessitated by the incongruity and
inconsistency of the Court’s own jurisprudence.  One
version of the Commerce Clause forbade federal
regulation to reach non-economic, local activity even if
that activity in the aggregate might very well
materially impact interstate commerce (per Lopez and
Morrison).  The other version of the Commerce Clause
was understood to reach wholly private, non-
commercial activity, like growing your own wheat or
cultivating your own personal marijuana for medicinal
purposes, neither of which might ever actually affect
interstate commerce (per Wickard and Raich).  But,
thankfully, Raich does not leave the vexing problem
unattended. 
The Court in Raich suggested how to reconcile the
differences between these two pairs of Commerce
Clause decisions.  This reconciliation rests in the
distinction between economic activities and non-
economic activities.  The legislation at issue in Lopez
and Morrison impermissibly dealt with local criminal
behavior that was rooted in violence, but which had no
necessary economic nexus as an activity.  That is, the
carrying of a gun or violence against a woman is not
economic activity in any generic way.  Wickard and
Raich, however, permissibly regulated local, non-
commercial activity because the cultivation of an
agricultural product and a regulated drug were
intrinsically economic activities.  In the Court’s own
words:
Despite congressional findings that such crimes
[violence against women in Morrison] had an
adverse impact on interstate commerce, we held
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the statute unconstitutional because, like the
statute in Lopez, it did not regulate economic
activity.  We concluded that “the noneconomic,
criminal nature of the conduct at issue was
central to our decision” in Lopez, and that our
prior cases had identified a clear pattern of
analysis: “Where economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.”
[Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610].
Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison,
the activities regulated by the [Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”), which criminalized
even private, medicinal marijuana,] are
quintessentially economic.  “Economics” refers
to “the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities.”  Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 720 (1966).  The
CSA is a statute that regulates the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities
for which there is an established, and lucrative,
interstate market.  Prohibiting the intrastate
possession or manufacture of an article of
commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized)
means of regulating commerce in that product.
Such prohibitions include specific decisions
requiring that a drug be withdrawn from the
market as a result of the failure to comply with
regulatory requirements as well as decisions
excluding Schedule I drugs entirely from the
market.  Because the CSA is a statute that
directly regulates economic, commercial
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activity, our opinion in Morrison casts no doubt
on its constitutionality.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26 (emphasis added). 
The point of this Commerce Clause analysis,
whether in the expansive rulings of Wickard and Raich
or the more careful federalism-sensitive rulings of
Lopez and Morrison, is that these cases and every
single other Commerce Clause decision since this
Nation’s founding unanimously and explicitly hold
that congressional power under this clause is strictly
and absolutely limited to some kind of affirmative
behavior or activity.  Whether it’s the “economic
activity” of the non-commercial growing of wheat
(Wickard) or marijuana (Raich) within the permissible
legislative scheme or the commercial activity of
providing lodging and food services to interstate
travelers in Heart of Atlanta Motel or Katzenbach,
before Congress can reach you through the Commerce
Clause, you must be engaged in some affirmative
activity. 
Moreover, as confirmed by Lopez, Morrison, and
Raich, activity alone (like possessing a gun or
assaulting a woman)—even if it will affect interstate
commerce in the aggregate over time—is not enough to
cross the Commerce Clause Rubicon.  The activity
must be economic.  But this means, at the very least,
that there must be some activity to apply the
Commerce Clause analysis.  And, as Lopez, Morrison,
and Raich make clear, that activity must in and of
itself be economic even if it need not be commercial.
3. a. The Act does not regulate economic activity,
but rather the decision to not engage in commercial or
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economic activity.  Consequently, the Act does not even
pretend to fit within any of the Court’s previous
Commerce Clause rulings.  The individual mandate
attaches to a legal resident of the United States who
chooses to sit at home and do nothing.  This resident,
quite literally, merely exists (i.e., he is “living” and
“breathing”).  See App. 116a.  He or she is neither
engaged in economic activity nor in any other activity
that would bring him or her within the reach of even
a legitimate regulatory scheme.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561
(holding that the non-commercial activity must be an
“essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated”) (emphasis added).  In this case, we have
neither economics nor activities.
b. The Act purports to provide legislative findings
to support Congress’s authority to enact the individual
mandate under the Commerce Clause.  According to
the Act: “The individual responsibility requirement
provided for in this section . . . is commercial and
economic in nature, and substantially affects
interstate commerce, as a result of the effects
described in paragraph (2).”  42 U.S.C. § 18091(1);
App. 143a.  Paragraph (2) sets forth various “[e]ffects
on the national economy and interstate commerce” to
support mandating the “individual responsibility
requirement.”  These findings make statements about
the general economic and commercial impact
healthcare and healthcare insurance has on the
national economy and how much of that impact is
harmful to healthcare generally and to the individual
specifically.  The legislative findings conclude by
suggesting that the proposed legislation ameliorates
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these deleterious effects of the current system.  See 42
U.S.C. § 18091(2); App. 143a-146a.
But none of these legislative findings are at all
relevant to the issue this lawsuit raises as a matter of
law: whether the federal government has authority
under the Commerce Clause to force Petitioners and
other similarly situated persons to purchase and
maintain a required level of insurance coverage or
suffer the consequences of a federally-imposed penalty.
Indisputably, Petitioners without healthcare
insurance—as volitionally uninsured legal residents of
the United States—are not now engaged in any
commercial or economic activity that affects in any
way interstate commerce.  This is because, unlike
Wickard and Raich, or Heart of Atlanta Motel and
Katzenbach, Petitioners are not engaged in any
economic activity whatsoever relative to the legislative
findings of the Act or the regulatory scheme of the
Act—essential or otherwise.  
As the Court forcefully pointed out in both Lopez
and Morrison, the national government is restrained
and constrained by federalism not to go beyond its
discreet and enumerated powers.  This fundamental
requirement of our federal government, which is and
remains the law of the land, was described by the
Court as a “first principle.”  Under the Commerce
Clause, Congress is limited to regulating at the far
reaches of its authority only local economic activity
that it rationally determines is an “essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated.”  See Lopez, 514
U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
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10 In Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4558
(June 16, 2011), the Court forcefully reemphasized the important
role federalism plays in protecting the integrity of government
and the freedom of individuals.  The Court stated as follows:
The Framers concluded that allocation of powers between
the National Government and the States enhances
freedom, first by protecting the integrity of the
governments themselves, and second by protecting the
people, from whom all governmental powers are
derived. . . .
Federalism secures the freedom of the individual.  It
allows States to respond, through the enactment of
positive law, to the initiative of those who seek a voice in
shaping the destiny of their own times without having to
rely solely upon the political processes that control a
remote central power. . . .
Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within
a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of
delegated governmental power cannot direct or control
their actions. . . .  By denying any one government
complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life,
federalism protects the liberty of the individual from
arbitrary power.  When government acts in excess of its
lawful powers, that liberty is at stake.
But these far reaches of congressional authority fall
far short of this case because the regulatory scheme of
the Act seeks to reach not just economic activity, but
mere existence and inactivity.  Thus, the Act seeks to
mandate that Petitioners cease their inactivity, and it
further designs a penalty scheme to deprive
Petitioners of their liberty to choose not to engage in a
private commercial transaction.10  
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Id. at *17-*19; see also id. at *29 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“In
short, a law beyond the power of Congress, for any reason, is no
law at all.”) (quotations and citation omitted).
11 If Congress has the power to force private citizens to purchase
healthcare insurance, then it would certainly have the power to
mandate the purchase of “minimum essential” life insurance.
Everyone is going to die, and death certainly has economic
consequences that affect interstate commerce, such as loss of
earning power of the deceased, burial costs, etc.
If the Act is understood to fall within Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority, the federal government
will have the absolute and unfettered power to create
complex regulatory schemes to fix every perceived
problem imaginable and to do so by ordering private
citizens to engage in affirmative acts, under penalty of
law, such as eating certain foods, taking vitamins,
losing weight, joining health clubs, buying a GMC
truck, or purchasing an AIG insurance policy,11 among
others.  Consequently, Congress will be incentivized to
create intrusive regulatory schemes as constitutional
cover for the naked power grabs, thereby turning the
Constitution on its head.
Moreover, it is a mistake to conclude that Congress
had Commerce Clause authority to enact the
individual mandate because the healthcare market is
unlike other markets.  Respondents argued below that
the Act properly regulates the economic activity of
healthcare because everyone will at some point in their
lives engage the healthcare market with economic
activity.  Therefore, according to the argument,
decisions made today could have future economic
effects.  Thus, Respondents’ argument is that the Act
properly creates a regulatory scheme and penalty
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based on presumed future economic activity—activity
that has not yet occurred and, indeed, may never
occur.  But this effort to make “healthcare” a kind of
sui generis economic activity based on presumed future
behavior is not justified by the Court’s Commerce
Clause jurisprudence nor does it provide a cogent
brake to, or principled limitation upon, the federal
government’s claim of unrestrained plenary power to
mandate all sorts of behavior, present and future, to
curb healthcare costs.  Simply because a particular
market might be unique in some fashion can’t be a
basis for extending Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority to include regulating decisions (and even
indecision) affecting that market.  Indeed, the same
could be said about the “food” market since every
living, breathing person must participate in that
market at some level or else they would perish.  Does
the Constitution permit Congress to force private
citizens to purchase “health” foods which they wouldn’t
otherwise purchase under penalty of federal law?
Moreover, precisely because the healthcare market is
unlike any other market in that a person’s health is
arguably affected by almost every decision made on a
daily basis, including whether to take vitamins, to
exercise, to maintain a certain body weight, etc.,
permitting Congress to regulate decisions affecting a
person’s health gives Congress unbridled power and
thus obliterates the very structure of our
constitutional Republic.  
In sum, the Court should grant the petition to
establish a meaningful limitation on congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. 
4. Review is also necessary to determine whether
the individual mandate is unconstitutional as applied
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to those Petitioners who do not have “minimum
essential” healthcare coverage.  As Petitioners argued
below, this case challenges the authority of Congress
to enact the individual mandate provision.  App. 163a.
That is, Petitioners challenge Congress’s authority to
force them—private citizens who are not by any
measure engaged in any relevant commerce—to
purchase “minimum essential” healthcare insurance
coverage as a matter of federal law.  App. 163a.
Consequently, this case could properly be viewed as an
“as-applied” challenge.  App. 163a.  However, by their
very nature, almost all challenges to the specific
exercise of an enumerated power, such as the
Commerce Clause, are facial challenges.  Thus, if
Congress lacked the authority to enact certain
legislation, such as the individual mandate, that
legislation adversely affects everyone in every
application.  In light of this reality, it does not appear
that the “no set of circumstances” language of United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), has any
practical impact on the resolution of this case.  As the
Court stated in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,
55 n.22 (1999), “To the extent we have consistently
articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, it is
not the Salerno formulation, which has never been the
decisive factor in any decision of this Court, including
Salerno itself.”
In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987), the Court stated, 
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of
course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid.  The fact that the [Act]
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might operate unconstitutionally under some
conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient
to render it wholly invalid, since we have not
recognized an “overbreadth” doctrine outside
the limited context of the First Amendment.
As Salerno itself suggests, if Congress lacked
enumerated authority to pass legislation at its
inception, as in this case, then there would be “no set
of circumstances . . . under which the Act would be
valid.”  Thus, there would be no “conceivable set of
circumstances” under which the Act could be enforced
because there was no authority to enact the legislation
in the first instance—the law is “legally stillborn.”  See
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768,
773-74 (E.D. Va. 2010);  see also App. 74a (dissenting).
Indeed, the Court did not cite Salerno, let alone
apply it, in either United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995), or United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000), cases in which the Court held that Congress
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority by enacting
certain legislation.  Nor did the Court cite to Salerno
in the more recent Commerce Clause case of Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Nonetheless, in his concurring opinion, which
provided the narrowest grounds for upholding the
individual mandate, Judge Sutton held that
Petitioners’ challenge was essentially “undone by
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).”
App. 74a (dissenting).  That is, Judge Sutton viewed
the constitutional question regarding Congress’s
authority to force private citizens to purchase and
maintain “minimum essential” healthcare insurance
coverage through the “no set of circumstances” prism
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of Salerno—a view that “favor[ed] the government.”
App.  51a-52a.  In doing so, Judge Sutton essentially
rewrote the individual mandate by placing limits on
the challenged authority of Congress that Congress
itself did not impose under the Act.  See App. 72a
(concluding that the individual mandate was
constitutional as applied to (1) individuals who
voluntarily purchased insurance and wanted to
maintain it, but not at the “minimum essential”
coverage limits, (2) individuals who voluntarily
purchased insurance, but who did not want to be
forced to maintain it at any level of coverage, (3)
individuals living in States that already required them
to purchase insurance, and (4) individuals under 30
who can satisfy the requirement by purchasing
catastrophic-care coverage).  Indeed, Congress granted
itself much greater authority to regulate private
citizens because that was its intent: to increase the
pool of insured by requiring those with no insurance to
purchase “minimum essential” coverage or pay a
penalty.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(C) (finding that the
individual mandate “will add millions of new
consumers to the health insurance market, increasing
the supply of, and demand for, health care services,
and will increase the number and share of Americans
who are insured”); App. 144a.  Aside from Judge
Sutton’s fourth example of “catastrophic-care coverage”
not yet purchased, every application of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power cited by him involved a
hypothetical in which the citizen was actually engaged
in commerce (i.e., the citizen purchased insurance
and/or was covered by an existing insurance plan).  By
applying Salerno to this case in the fashion employed
by Judge Sutton, he—and thus the court—essentially
avoided answering the fundamental question of
whether Congress acted within its Commerce Clause
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power when it passed legislation requiring nearly all
citizens, notably those without insurance, to purchase
and maintain health insurance coverage beginning in
2014.  Consequently, the Court should grant the
petition to answer this important question of federal
law, see Sup. Ct. R. 10(c)—and answer it in the
negative.  
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
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